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 The didactic death  
Publicity, instruction, and body donation 
 
 
Jacob COPEMAN, University of Edinburgh 
Deepa S. REDDY, University of Houston–Clear Lake 
 
 
 
What value does death acquire when body organs are pledged for transplantation? Deaths 
may be made public by a stated desire to donate, and a matter of public debate precisely 
because the desire is denied. This essay explores two case studies from India of attempts to 
donate organs: one of a condemned prisoner, and the other of a former Marxist chief 
minister of West Bengal. One of these attempts was idealized and exalted, the other 
thwarted; both gave rise to considerable public conversation. We treat the public nature of 
these deathbed wishes as moral dramas, for at the heart of each is a quite wrenching contest 
over the donor’s soul—or its this-worldly equivalent, his legacy—that serves equally as an 
opportunity to reignite projects of social reform and (re)educate different social 
constituencies. We thus focus on the didactic functions of donation, where the principal 
issue at stake is the intention of the dying person to gift his or her organs. We ask, what 
does organ donation mean at the point of death? We argue that there is more at stake than 
just the possibilities of saving lives. Rather, these unfolding moral dramas become 
opportunities for, among other things, Brahminism to be rejected, superstition to be 
transcended, the values of a modernizing state to be reaffirmed, and a broad spectrum of 
civic virtues to be inculcated. Pledging one’s body when death is imminent and inevitable 
becomes the final chance to rewrite the course of a life, to make a worthy biographical 
statement, and to turn the intimately personal into something of public value. How does 
the dying donor speak? As murderer, Marxist—or more? 
Keywords: death, biography, atheism, synecdoche, body/organ donation, India, publicity, 
Marxism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This essay concerns the tutelary value of death. Focusing on India, we examine 
several recent highly public deaths that were the subject of considerable media 
commentary and deliberation, which suggest the emergence of an instructional 
idiom of dying. Imminent, expected deaths, made public by a stated desire on the 
part of the dying person to donate his or her organs or body, may be received 
either with public approbation or denunciation. Consequently, such a death may 
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open out as a kind of moral drama, in which the attempt to donate can acquire a 
role both exemplary and pedagogical.1 These deaths become rhetorical sites for 
elaborate public contests over biomoralities, particularly tensions between claims to 
modernization, reason, and scientific temperament on the one hand, and 
perceived superstition, ritual, and cultural narrow-mindedness on the other. The 
dying donor’s gesture may become the final chance to rewrite the course of a life, 
to make a worthy biographical statement. Such gestures may also set out examples 
and teach lessons, becoming occasions for, among other things, Brahminism to be 
rejected, superstition to be transcended, the values of a modernizing state to be 
reaffirmed, and a broad spectrum of civic virtues to be inculcated. Yet also 
important are the rhetorical and practical limits that may be placed on all these 
“good things”; attempts to make a death didactic in a particular (modernizing) 
manner may be countered by an emphasis on quite other forms of instruction 
occasioned by the public death. 
We focus on two noteworthy didactic deaths: that of veteran Marxist and long-
time West Bengal chief minister Jyoti Basu (1914–2010), and of convicted 
murderer and rapist Dhananjoy Chatterjee (1965–2004), sentenced to death by 
hanging. Both figures publicly expressed desires to donate their organs upon 
death; both cases drew out ethico-moral lessons centered on the values of reason 
and public interest over superstition and narrow family-mindedness. Basu attained 
the status of positive exemplar, his wishes honored, idealized, and performed with 
considerable ceremony. Chatterjee, however, was ultimately held up as a different 
kind of example, a warning to other would-be rapists and murderers, his wish to 
donate becoming a matter of public debate precisely because it was denied. 
The locus classicus of the didactic death in modern India is the anticolonial 
freedom struggle, with freedom fighter martyrs dying instructional deaths of a 
different kind. For instance, patriotic paintings of these heroes of the nationalist 
movement—their bloody heads offered to Mother India—were designed, in part, to 
offer their martyrdom as worthy of emulation (Ramaswamy 2008: 836). The first 
of our case studies was offered by public officials and the media as a mode of dying 
similarly worthy of emulation, though for a different reason—for Basu’s passing was 
glorified as a prototypical and exemplary reason-valorizing death. In the second 
case, however, we find strident rejections of a model of death that attempts 
redemption via the same “rational” means so widely lauded in the prior case: its 
didactic value is that of negative exemplar. Yet the rejection, critically, is founded 
on agreement among commentators concerning the worth of this kind of public 
death. Chatterjee’s desire was perceived as unambiguously redemptive by all 
observers and contention over its appropriateness emerges from this basic 
agreement. Those who think it good, think it a suitable mode of redemption, and 
those who do not, think it conflicts with the act of execution as redemption. We 
seek to show that the will to donate on death has an assuredly moral, even heroic, 
character and it is precisely for this reason that a criminal is seen as unentitled to it. 
Karin Barber (2009) has noted that analysis of news reports grants the 
possibility of attending to emergence: the reporting of events in piecemeal fashion, 
                                                
1. We draw the term “moral drama” from Spencer (2007: 79) who employs it in reference 
to Sri Lankan electoral politics as a performative ritual space “within which people can 
express their visions of moral community and moral order.” 
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as they happen, and the recording of reader reactions, as these are being formed, 
creates both a testing-ground for new narratives as well as a record of the fragile 
contexts of their coming into being. In her comments on Telling lives (2004), 
David Arnold and Stuart Blackburn’s recent edited work on biography and 
autobiography in India, Barber (2007: 183) notes further that the long-established 
South Asian genre of the exemplary narrative—a mode of life-writing “written not 
about oneself but only about others whose example one would wish to emulate”—
persisted throughout the colonial period in tension with new forms of 
autobiographical writing. We see newspapers as key sites in which the genre of the 
exemplary narrative endures: a public rewriting, even a reclaiming, amid the many 
dead ends, thriving or faltering notions, trivia, and big stories of daily reportage. 
The result: exemplary lives (and deaths) may now be writ far larger, thrust onto the 
national, even global, stage, courtesy of the processes of intense mediatization 
through which the genre persists.  
The singular biographical power of the dying donor’s gesture abides in the way 
it seems to allow the preceding life to be read anew, the course of a life to be 
freshly considered. It is in this sense that we may observe the synecdochal nature 
of the public body donation, with either the wish to donate or the effected 
donation itself seemingly able to recast perceptions of the whole of a life. The 
synecdochal quality of the wished-for body donation recalls the cosmological 
significance read into dying moments generally in South Asia. There is the Hindu 
idea, for instance, that “at the moment of death, the most prominent thought in 
one’s consciousness comes forth to determine the course the soul takes after 
leaving the body. It is, therefore, very auspicious for the dying to hear the name of 
God chanted aloud by those present at the bedside” (Brahmaprana 2001: 344), 
while a well-known tenet of Theravada Buddhism is “the belief that deeds done or 
ideas seized at the moment of death are particularly significant” (McDermott 1980: 
168). 
Connected to this is a preoccupation with dying words; indeed, an intense 
politics of accusation has emerged surrounding the disputed last words of 
Mahatma Gandhi (Lal 2001). Such a preoccupation is, of course, by no means 
restricted to South Asian contexts. Of particular note here is the attention that was 
paid—in adherence to the ars moriendi tradition of the Good Death—to the final 
moments, and in particular dying words, of kin members in eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century America. As Drew Gilpin Faust (2008: 10) explains, 
[F]amily members needed to witness a death in order to assess the state 
of the dying person’s soul, for these critical last moments of life would 
epitomize his or her spiritual condition. The dying were not losing their 
essential selves, but rather defining them for eternity. . . . Last words 
had always held a place of prominence in the ars moriendi tradition. By 
the eighteenth century “dying declarations” had assumed—as they still 
retain—explicit secular importance: a special evidentiary 
status. . . . People believed final words to be the truth, both because 
they thought a dying person could no longer have any earthly motivation 
to lie, and because those about to meet their maker would not want to 
expire bearing false witness. 
We similarly underscore the special evidentiary status of public body donations as 
a novel and interesting species of dying declaration. Declarations of intent to 
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donate one’s body may variously provide evidence of steadfast materialism, the 
formal abandonment of “mischievous” superstitions, or repentance for criminal 
acts, as we shall see. They come to possess marked life-defining significance in the 
synecdochic biographical sense discussed above. Also echoing the ars moriendi 
tradition, the deaths with which we are concerned present not only a powerful 
commentary on the preceding life but form lessons for others: 
Last words . . . communicated invaluable lessons to those gathered 
around the deathbed. This didactic function provided a critical means 
through which the deceased could continue to exist in the lives of 
survivors. The teaching that last words imparted served as a lingering 
exhortation and a persisting tie between the living and the dead. (Drew 
Gilpin Faust 2008: 10–11)  
The sections that follow draw out the differing ways in which modernizing 
significance is read into each of our two principal case studies. We ask how these 
publically stated, publically claimed desires to donate organs turn personal, 
biographical statements into something of wider instructional and civic value—
recasting the value of death and life in the same broad stroke. 
  
Pedagogical contexts 
At least part of the utility of colonial (Western) medicine in India for many of its 
advocates and practitioners was as a tool to sweep away caste, custom, and 
superstition; an explicit method, in India as elsewhere, of curing not only bodies, 
but also superstitions (Arnold 1993: 58). Indeed, Western medicine, as a 
pedagogical project, was the therapeutic arm of a wider civilizing process. Of 
paradigmatic importance here was the matter of anatomy and dissection.  
Local negative attitudes toward dissection were viewed by colonial 
commentators as evidence of the superstition from which colonial rule would 
liberate them. But anatomy was considered not only practically “necessary,” but 
(iconically) “exemplary” according to Arnold (1993: 5). It had become firmly 
established as the “scientific keystone to the study of medicine” (Gorman 1988: 
284), and it was so heavily freighted with taboo and stigma that the project of 
fostering a cluster of eager trainee dissectors became representative of the wider 
civilizing mission invoked by the British as justifying their presence in the 
subcontinent.  
The British achieved a measure of success, resulting in a torrent of triumphalist 
rhetoric (Gorman 1988: 285). Upon the first dissection by an Indian in 1836, Fort 
William fired a gun salute in order to celebrate Indians having—in the words of 
one commentator—finally risen “superior to the prejudices of their earlier 
education and thus boldly flung open the gates of modern medical science to their 
fellow countrymen” (Arnold 1993: 6). And, notwithstanding present-day reports of 
discomfort experienced by Hindu vegetarian medical trainees when dissecting 
cadavers (Vijayabhaskar et al. 2005), it is certainly true that one rarely hears 
nowadays of trainee doctors declining to dissect cadavers. The question now 
concerns less demand than supply, with a corresponding displacement of 
obstructionist “superstition.” The present situation therefore parallels that of the 
earlier career of anatomy: those who do not sign up for the postmortem donation 
of their bodies or organs (because, usually, of their wish to undergo conventional 
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cremation rites), like the medical trainees who earlier withdrew in disgust from 
dissection classes, become, by default, less-than-modern. As was the case in 
colonial times with reference to dissection, the donation of the body or its parts 
takes on a paradigmatic status as a means to shed—or to emphatically demonstrate 
having shed—superstition, and to make iconically modern subjects. Now, as Arnold 
(1993: 294) notes, “the colonizing processes of colonial medicine could never find 
their fulfillment in colonial hands alone.” The successor to British colonial 
physicians and administrators is an enlightened Indian elite, usually embodied in 
civil-social institutions with connections to the nationalist movement, which exists 
less “as a quaint remnant of colonial modernity” than as a “serious protagonist of a 
project of cultural modernization still to be completed” (Chatterjee 1998: 63). But 
where for colonial officials it was a readiness to dissect cadavers that was saturated 
with modernizing significance as a critical marker of rationalization, the equivalent 
marker for the present-day progressive elite is a readiness to voluntarily donate 
bodily material. 
The medical community’s attribution of people’s reluctance to donate body 
substances to superstition and benightedness is not, of course, limited to India.2 
But in contemporary India, the donation of bodily substances—whether organs, 
blood, or the body in its entirety—has attained a very particular stature as both 
critical means and evidence of scientifically oriented reform: a stature consequent 
on the widespread opinion that it is in this domain that an intensely concentrated 
set of taboos, rituals, and other assorted forms of “backwardness,” compelling to 
the population at large and extremely disruptive to the cause of donation, reside. 
Backwardness, as Lawrence Cohen (2007: 107) explains, “enjoys a sort of national 
conversation” in India, and the domain of biological exchange—the hindrances, 
indicative of backwardness, to which it is subject—is a particular locus of this 
conversation. Indeed, a brief review of news reports on campaigns to foster acts of 
blood and organ donation turns up references to “superstitions, taboos, obscure 
ideas of bygone centuries [that] stand in the way of progress,” “inherent prejudices 
and religious taboos,” “poor people with religious biases,” and the need to “serve” 
society by “trying to rid it of superstition.”3 Recent research reports on obstacles to 
organ and cornea donation broadly confirm these media assessments—in fact 
calling upon the media to embark on enhanced public awareness and education 
campaigns to address the problem (Dhaliwal 2002; Gupta 2009; Shaishav and 
Desai 2011: 271), while ethnographic data on potential post mortem body 
(Copeman 2006) and blood donors (Copeman 2009a) likewise indicate the 
presence of many of the inhibiting attitudes attributed to them by rationalists and 
the press. Briefly, some of the most significant inhibiting “taboos” and 
“misconceptions” recorded are (1) the idea that any organ taken from a person will 
be missing in their next birth; for example, an eye donor will be reborn without 
eyes or else blind; (2) an attachment to cremation as an integral and indispensable 
life cycle ritual (known as dah sanskar (the “sacrament of fire”) or as antyeshti (the 
“last sacrifice”) (Parry 1994: 178), understood to preclude body donation; and (3) 
                                                
2. As Sharp (2006: 24, 72), for example, has shown for the United States. 
3. The Hindu (Chennai), September 25, 2000; The Telegraph (Kolkata), February 26, 
2006; Daily Excelsior (Janipura), May 2, 2005. 
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the idea that blood, once donated, results in a permanent volumetric deficit, so that 
its donation becomes equivalent to an amputation.  
Of course, there is a credible argument that progress in this area is hindered as 
much by the lack of an adequate organizational framework or coordination 
between governmental and medical agencies than by such popular beliefs, but it is 
the latter explanation that often dominates discussion of shortages of this or that 
bodily substance. Given the distillate of taboo and misapprehension that is said to 
characterize responses to donation prospects, the perception has become 
entrenched among rationalist groups and other social reformers that to persuade a 
person to accede to such exhortations is to persuade them to accede to much more 
besides. Thus have body, organ, and blood donation come to be situated at the 
heart of Indian projects of social reform—defined as iconically reformist medical 
practices and pressed into service as instruments of pedagogy. As with the 
performance of dissection in 1830s India, pledging one’s body or organs or both 
provides dazzling evidence to social reformers that, in the words of a colonial 
anatomy professor, “the prejudices of ages [may indeed be] overthrown and the 
iron bonds of a most debasing and mischievous superstition burst asunder” (cited 
in Gorman 1988: 285). 
 
Dying demonstrations 
The anatomy professor’s words echo through contemporary rationalist activism. 
While the Indian rationalist movement by no means encompasses all Indian 
attitudes toward rationality and humanism, and is itself significantly internally 
differentiated (Quack 2011), it does in certain key ways set the terms of debate that 
critically frame each of our case studies below. To offer only a brief summary, 
Indian rationalists first organized at around the time of Independence, inspired by 
such radical social reformers as Jyotirao Phule (1827–1890), Periyar Ramasami 
(1879–1973; founder of the Tamil Self-Respect Movement), and famed atheist 
Goparaju Ramachandra Rao, more popularly known as Gora (1902–1975). Each 
of these reformers was particularly concerned with addressing caste inequities and 
Brahminical hegemony, and contemporary Indian rationalism is similarly invested 
in undoing the ritual authority traditionally vested in the Brahmin priest. 
Rationalist organizations include the Delhi-based Indian Rationalist Association 
(IRA; founded 1949) and the Satya Shodhak Sabha (Society of Truth Seekers), as 
well as others like West Bengal’s Gana Darpan that take their cue from the 
rationalist movement but have more specific agendas (motivating body donation as 
a means of promoting scientific temper). Still other organizations focus 
emphatically on secular social development work, while others concentrate on 
myth- and guru-busting: sometimes dramatically exposing religious miracles as 
essentially shams, and gurus as leaders who propagate fears to hold their followers 
captive. In 1997, the Federation of Indian Rationalist Associations (FIRA) was 
established to coordinate the work of a growing range of rationalist, atheist, skeptic, 
and secularist groups in different regions of India. FIRA is affiliated to the 
International Humanist and Ethical Union, suggesting an increasingly international 
framework of operation. Rationalist organizations are not typically political parties, 
though their agendas, approaches, and membership overlap considerably with 
those of the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India-
THE DIDACTIC DEATH | 
2012 | HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2 (2): 59–83 
65 
Marxist (CPI-M), parties that have been particularly influential in West Bengal—the 
state in which our two cases are situated—and Kerala.  
Rationalist and science promotion organizations throughout India stage blood 
donation camps and events at which people can sign their last will and testament to 
donate their bodies and organs after their death—as declarations of their undying 
rationality at the point of death. We offer the following examples as indicative of 
the iconicity of bodily donation within movements to promote a “scientific temper” 
and its stature as not only evidence but means of reform: an Indian Telegraph 
news article headlined “51 donors follow Ellora example” describes a function 
organized by the Ellora Vigyan Manch in Guwahati, Assam in honor of Ellora 
Roychoudhury who, five years earlier, her death imminent, had pledged her body 
for medical training and research. Fifty-one “philanthropists” followed her example 
in pledging their bodies in the presence of the local senior subregistrar. Local 
social activist Anima Guha, who also pledged her body at the same event, 
reportedly “appreciated the efforts of the mancha in spreading scientific temper 
and fighting superstitions. . . . ‘The Ellora Vigyan Mancha, since its inception, 
has launched a movement to spread scientific temper among the people and to 
fight superstition. In response to our campaign, 219 people have so far pledged 
their eyes and bodies for the service of humanity.’” 4  We think this example 
demonstrates that it is precisely because cadaver donation, as one news report put 
it, “is still a radical idea in society,” impeded by “useless rituals,” that it has become 
both icon and instrument for a rationalist movement engaged in a pedagogical 
mission to change a purportedly backward society.5 Of particular interest is the 
report’s emphasis on Ellora Roychoudhury’s original pledge: as an example 
inspiring others to likewise pledge their bodies. Deaths, where body donation is 
successfully facilitated, become a site of moral instruction, a way of dying that 
others are now encouraged to emulate.  
Elite rationalist institutions are not by any means the only proponents of bodily 
donation in India. We have written elsewhere of North Indian devotional 
movements as some of the most prolific providers of voluntarily donated blood in 
the country, and of the invocation of Hindu ethics and imageries in promoting the 
cause of body donations (Copeman 2006, 2009a; Reddy 2007). When rationalism 
replaces religion as inspiration for social reform, however, or when religious 
organizations endorse modernizing, democratic logics so as to become platforms 
for tissue collection, our point is that these modular forms acquire a distinctly 
demonstrative edge. The obituaries of noted rationalist activists nearly always 
record that their bodies were donated to medical science. So, for instance, after the 
Keralan rationalist leader Joseph Edamaruku died in 2006, it was noted in the 
second paragraph of his official obituary that, “As per his wishes his eyes were 
donated to All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS). The body is now kept 
at Kerala House for Public Homage. Later in the evening the body will be handed 
over to the anatomy department of AIIMS, for the use of medical students.”6 The 
prominence of this biographical detail in Edamaruku’s obituary is surely telling: 
                                                
4. The Telegraph (Calcutta), May 16, 2008. 
5. The Hindu, January 30, 2010. 
6. http://www.rationalistinternational.net  
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doubly powerful as a means to circumvent normative rituals of death and as a 
contribution to medical science. Body donation fulfilled is an article of faith in 
reason, a proof of atheism and self-consistency.  
Three years later, in 2009, the eminent Indian atheist and figurehead of the 
contemporary Indian rationalist movement B. Premanand lay dying in a hospital in 
Coimbatore. As he did, the editor of the journal Bangalore Skeptic sent an email 
to a rationalist list detailing Premanand’s deteriorating health. He asserted that 
while “his vital organs have been affected,” his “brain and his ideology remain 
intact, and we wanted the world to know about it and to make a declaration on his 
behalf that it remains so.” This was important because there was apparently a 
rumor that, on his deathbed, this noted atheist had “started believing in god and 
supernatural powers.” His rationalist friends therefore put a statement to him for 
his signature (his hands were weak so a thumb impression was taken) to counter 
the rumors and allegations. This “declaration of attitude and temperament” stated:  
It is common for the purveyors of superstitions and such anti rational 
forces to start spreading rumours about rationalists turning to god and 
other supernatural forces at the end of their lives and becoming devotees 
of gods and god men of various types. It is also claimed that at times of 
crises that we staunch rationalists turn to spiritualism and religion. I wish 
to clarify that as on today the twentieth of September 2009 I remain a 
staunch rationalist and wish to place on record the following: A. I 
continue to be a rationalist of full conviction. B. I do not believe in any 
supernatural power. All the powers that we encounter are in the realm of 
nature and nothing exists beyond that. C. I do not believe in the 
existence of the soul or rebirth. D. I have not turned to any religion, god 
or any sort of spiritual pursuits. E. When I pass away I shall be leaving 
only my body which is to be donated to a medical college and no spirit 
or soul to cause problems for the living.7  
The final point about avoiding the creation of problems for the living is significant. 
This is a reference to the widespread understanding that dead persons possess a 
continued (and unwelcome) existence in disembodied, ghostly form, and that they 
must be placated with a variety of offerings. In a reversal of this idea of the dead 
causing difficulties for the living, the director of an atheist organization in 
Vijayawada states that atheists who, “in recognition of the fact that there’s no life 
after death pledge for organ, eye and body donation,” devise ceremonies that “try 
to improve the quality of life here on earth.”8 The contrast is clear: the dead may, 
via body donation, not disrupt but assist the living. Moreover, the critical 
reassertion of a commitment to body donation in Premanand’s rejoinder to the 
rumor that he had recanted seems to point again emphatically to the status of body 
donation as a special indicator of self-consistency and steadfastness. Premanand’s 
atheism transparently endures and the lesson elaborated in his life is reaffirmed in 
his dying commitment to the donation of his body. 
                                                
7. “Report on B. Premanand,” email from Bangalore Skeptic, September 22, 2009. 
Compare with the tale told of David Hume’s death: “It is said that the rabble of 
Edinburgh congregated around his house demanding to know when the atheist would 
recant” (Hacking 1986: 238). 
8. www.iheu.org/atheist-ceremonies   
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“What Jyoti  Babu did in his death .  .  .  ”  
We turn now from the indicative to the precipitative function of this form of dying. 
How does such a death teach? We begin with a scenario, which though rare for 
being smooth around the edges, is important for demarcating the space in which 
this sort of ideal gets manifested. This is the case of Jyoti Basu, the former Marxist 
chief minister (state-level head of government) of West Bengal (1977–2000), who 
died on January 17, 2010, aged 95. We seek to show how newspaper obituaries’ 
unyielding attention to the former chief minister’s donation-in-death brought the 
virtues of body donation fully into “charismatic focus” (Mazzarella 2006: 482). Our 
argument therefore connects with Cohen’s (2008: 35) observation that the 
biographies of chief ministers, across India, constitute a distinct charismatic form 
which “collapses [together] a series of ideological and policy commitments, distinct 
populist aesthetics, and biographical narrative.” Here, the charismatic “life story” 
of the former chief minister becomes the stimulus for a major media campaign to 
boost body donation. Together with the solemn ritual aesthetic of a state funeral, 
this death is glorified and offered up to citizens as worthy of emulation. The 
politician’s biography is thus mobilized as a key contemporary instance of the 
Indian tradition of “lives as lessons,” which crosscuts religious denominations 
(Arnold and Blackburn 2004: 8, 20)—a tradition, we argue, that finds one of its 
most vital present-day manifestations in the print media. Press reports focused 
unremittingly on the fate of Basu’s corpse:  
Muted slogans . . . wafted in the chilly afternoon air as Basu’s body 
wrapped in the red flag emerged from the hospital in a hearse after 3 
PM. . . . Groups of mourners stood by the side of the road as the 
hearse made its way in a 30-car convoy to . . . the mortuary Peace 
Haven. . . . Basu’s body will lie embalmed there all of tomorrow. On 
Tuesday, it will be taken to . . . the CPM party office and finally to 
SSKM Hospital. As Basu had wished, the body will be donated to the 
medical school.9  
Subsequent articles lingered on the donation, and they soon began to seek lessons 
from it:  
Basu’s eyes were removed soon after his death this morning. His body 
will be handed over to the SSKM Hospital authorities on 
Tuesday. . . . Roy, the general secretary of Gana Darpan, an 
organisation that promotes the cause of body donation, said: “The 
nonagenarian Basu’s organs (almost all dysfunctional when he died) will 
not be of much use any more. But his body will help medical students 
learn more. Above all, it will inspire many people to donate their mortal 
remains for the benefit of future generations.10  
Reports emphasized the novelty of a state funeral, which incorporated the 
choreography of a cadaver donation:  
Till the sonorous strains of The Last Post being played by the army band 
began wafting in the winter air, there had been nothing to suggest that 
                                                
9. The Telegraph, January 18, 2010. 
10. The Telegraph, January 18, 2010, emphasis added. 
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this wasn’t a conventional state funeral. The gun carriage bearing Basu’s 
body stood in the middle with four pall-bearers. [A party official] made 
his way through the throng of VIPs, carrying the document Basu had 
signed pledging his body to the cause of medical science. Son Chandan 
had handed the certificate to the front chairman moments earlier, so that 
Basu’s “last rites” could be completed in the manner he had wished. 
[The] Health minister . . . joined . . . a team of doctors in receiving 
the document. The front chief then took the microphone. “In keeping 
with Jyotibabu’s last wish, the body is being handed over to the [hospital]. 
They have received it and have given us a receipt in exchange.”11 
Procedures concerning the former chief minister’s body were marked by 
intense fascination. Conscious of the preserved bodies of Lenin and Mao Zedong, 
one report was headlined “Party balks at embalm tradition.” 12  Another was 
headlined “Pioneer seeks Basu brain: Good mental faculties make organ ideal 
sample.”13 Several days later came confirmation: “The brain that had ruled Bengal 
for 23 years has been permanently preserved.” Strikingly, though the party may 
have balked at the embalming of the body á la Lenin, part-preservation is achieved 
(by other means, and—ostensibly, at least—for other purposes): “Basu’s body was 
donated to the hospital’s anatomy department on January 19. . . . After that it 
was injected with embalming fluid and put in a temperature-controlled cold 
chamber.” 14  Intimate procedural and corporeal details are then extensively 
elaborated: 
According to doctors, the dissection of Basu’s skull started from his 
forehead. “After taking the brain out, we dipped it in formalin 
solution.” . . . The doctors also plan to preserve the other body parts 
over the next four days. “ . . . We will dissect his body to bring out his 
lungs, intestines, kidneys, heart and liver. The condition of the body is 
still very good for preservation of its organs,” said a doctor.15  
The doctors stressed that Basu’s body was fit for preservation, though there was 
fluid accumulation in several parts:  
“Our doctors did a real good job. The fluid was partly drained out by 
cutting the skin in some areas. Some of it was dried inside the body with 
the help of chemical embalming.” . . . The doctors also plan to preserve 
Basu’s bones [but] are uncertain about [their] condition . . . which may 
have become fragile because of fluid accumulation and old age. 
However, the authorities are still undecided on whether to put his organs 
in the department’s anatomy museum. “We are waiting for instructions 
from the state government.” . . . [A] number of senior professors and 
students from the other departments wanted a glimpse of Basu’s body.”16 
                                                
11. The Telegraph, January 20, 2010. 
12. The Telegraph, January 19, 2010. 
13. The Telegraph, January 19, 2010. 
14. The Telegraph, January 28, 2010. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid.. 
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A number of important points proceed from this intriguing passage, some of 
which, for South Asianist scholars, will appear strangely familiar. Now the political-
institutional form of the South Indian big man may equally be a guru, politician, or 
another category of leader. Reminiscent of charismatic kingship, such figures 
embody a redistributive centrality, their constituents attracted by their altruistic 
patronage (Mines and Gourishankar 1990: 763, 780). Basu, of course, appears to 
fit just such a template of the generous leader, even if his kingly zenith was reached 
only in death. Connected to this is a preoccupation with the power after death of 
the deceased’s body parts: the dispersal of powerful figures’ limbs in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries could result in their becoming shrine centers, 
with the figures’ dominion being therefore, “still . . . an active and expanding 
network of power even after his death” (Bayly 1989: 403). Though the news 
reports pay attention to the frailty and fragility of Basu’s cadaver (the “fluid 
accumulation and old age” of his bones, etc.), the will to preserve, the lingering 
enumeration of the individualized parts of Basu’s body and the capture of 
knowledge through them, and finally the seeking of understanding through Basu’s 
very own organ of apperception—his brain; all this, perhaps, suggests an attempt to 
incorporate the political big man’s power, especially at the moment of his death.  
But probably most telling here is the former chief minister’s communism. His 
donation was the postmortem enactment of a “physiological collectivism.”17 Basu’s 
body was donated by the party, the stately handing over itself being incorporated 
into the high drama of communist political ritual. Several of Basu’s relatives were 
reported to be reluctant to honor his pledge, feeling “it would be better not to put 
[Basu’s corpse] under the scalpels of anatomy students in view of his advanced age 
and public sentiments.”18 Ultimately though, the family “left the decision to the 
party,” and the donation was effected.19 The collectivist (and emulative) connection 
is made explicit: “Yesterday, I heard what Jyotibabu had said after pledging his 
body—‘I knew that communists worked for the people till their last breath. But I 
didn’t know it would be possible to serve the people even after my death.’ I was so 
moved that I decided to donate my body.”20  
This is framed as a redemption of the CPI-M’s political mistakes. Obituaries 
refer to the “stagnation” that he oversaw and other “failures of Basu’s long reign,” 
while on his retirement from politics in 1999 his time in office received mixed 
verdicts, even from those sympathetic to the CPI-M. For instance, commentaries 
noted that his tenure as chief minister saw West Bengal slide from sixth to 
seventeenth position in state education league tables and the severe curtailment of 
                                                
17. This phrase is Douglas Starr’s (1998: 76–77). 
18. The Telegraph, January 18, 2010. 
19. Ibid. 
20. The Telegraph, January 22, 2010. The cumulative effect of such citations is an 
idealized picture of a smooth progress toward rationality as exemplified by the now-
willing donor. But it is not usually so straightforward. The family members of avowed 
rationalists and others, due to their strong attachment to cremation—understood to be 
indispensable for allowing the spirit of the deceased to travel on its way to the realm of 
the pitr-loka (ancestors)—frequently seek to obstruct the body donations of their 
relatives—see Copeman (2006) and Copeman and Quack (forthcoming). 
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the industrial economy (Abdi 1999). Critical though some obituaries are, however, 
they unanimously laud his exemplary pledge and its honoring, with Basu becoming 
an even better Marxist in death than he was throughout his life. We argue that in 
some respects, pledging his body allowed Basu, at the point of his death, to refocus 
his political legacy. We also see as significant the heavily orchestrated visibilization 
of this act of service, for it was in part its extreme visibility that made Basu’s 
donation ideal for a program of public instruction. As mentioned above, local 
newspapers turned the event of Basu’s death into a campaign for body donation. 
The Calcutta Telegraph headlined its January 22, 2010 front-page report, “Body 
pledged to be like Basu,” and presented sound bites from people who had 
previously been reluctant to donate their bodies, but who now, having witnessed 
Basu’s corporeal magnanimity, had had a change of heart. 
An obituary published in the Kerala-based e-magazine CounterCurrents.org, 
however, drew a more radical set of lessons from Basu’s death, which related to 
waste, superstition and anti-Brahminism.21 Roughly half of the lengthy obituary 
focuses on Basu’s donation-in-death. The author asserts, “Jyoti Babu has created 
an example. He has proved that a true Marxist remains true to Marxist philosophy 
or not succumbing to any religious rituals . . . [he] lived up to his convictions, a 
true Marxist, an atheist and a firm believer in science.” As in the cases of 
Premanand and Edamaruku mentioned earlier, the emphasis here is on legacy and 
self-consistency, body donation affirming the former and providing redoubtable 
proof of the latter. The donation provided a further confirmation: “Jyoti Basu has 
debunked all those who feel that India cannot be a country of nonbelievers.” As 
was noted earlier, in the ars moriendi tradition discussed by Faust (2008) the 
critical last moments of life would “epitomise his or her spiritual condition.” 
Evidently, for Basu his dying gesture epitomized his materialist constancy but the 
logic of synecdochal biography is hardly dissimilar.  
From the radical humanist vantage point of this obituary, Basu’s gesture offered 
the tantalizing prospect of taking away one of Brahmin priests’ principal means of 
employment—the conduct of funerary rituals. His donation, moreover, is the 
reverse of political double standards:  
Claiming to die for the masses, we have seen our political class like to be 
cremated among weeping people and amidst the chant of Vaidik 
Mantras by aristocratic Brahmins. . . . The cremation of a political 
leader is again an opportunity for greedy priestly class to pontificate us 
on greatness of religious virtues for the purpose of spreading their virus.  
Further: 
The racist brahmanical philosophy has preached us that donating your 
eyes and body is dangerous. Jyoti Basu has saved us from priestly 
pontification. . . . In the villages, people offer their income to 
Brahmins in hope the dead person would get it. If we have to make the 
brahmanical priestly class redundant, we must follow what Jyoti Babu 
did, by donating our bodies and shunning the rituals, we are so fond of, 
in the name of our culture. One hopes, our political class will learn a 
                                                
21. Selections quoted here from Jyoti Basu’s obituary can be accessed at the 
CounterCurrents.org website:  http://www.countercurrents.org/rawat180110.htm.  
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lesson from this that life is meant to serve the people and it ends here, 
there is no point in getting yourself purified by the priestly class which 
has cheated the people for centuries in the name of death and birth.  
Though the obituary does refer to the furnishing of medical science and possible 
saving of lives consequent on Basu’s gesture, there is clearly far more at stake. 
Basu’s public donation became an opportunity for, among other things, 
Brahminism to be rejected, humanism to be emphasized, and superstition to be 
transcended. An exhilarating prospect of humanistic reversal and subtraction is 
speculated on: not gifts from the living to the dead, but gifts from the dead to the 
living—and in the process, the mediation of the grasping Brahmin priest is 
eliminated. 
Reformist anti-Brahmin movements have sought, of course, to bypass the 
priestly class for centuries. Here, however, we witness a new and hitherto 
unexplored manner of achieving this. Christopher Pinney (2004: 190) has 
described how mass-produced images of the gods “gives formerly excluded classes 
access to all the high gods, whom they can [now] approach directly without the 
intercession of priests,” while Copeman (2011) has explored controversies 
generated by the giving of ritual donations online—donations conventionally given 
via Brahmin ritual specialists. If the Internet is the present paradigmatic example of 
a disintermediating technology, we see that the logics of body donation that emerge 
from Basu’s death suggest equally rich possibilities for disintermediating the 
Brahmin priest by way of recasting the mediations involved in handling death and 
the dying, and replacing one set of social contingencies with purportedly more 
modern and transparent others.  
The lessons learned from Basu’s exemplary death were thus numerous and 
varied. The aforementioned polemical obituary might constitute an alternative 
understanding of the death’s didacticism—certainly, we did not find the anti-
Brahminical angle replicated in many other sources dealing with Basu’s death—but 
online commentators seemed to agree that the donation-in-death possessed 
instructional value for the eradication of superstition and inculcation of civic 
virtues. There was also agreement about the donation itself: Basu commits publicly 
to donating a year before he dies; his family, though to some degree hesitant, does 
not object. His eyes go to a recipient, the rest to “medical research”; his “political 
mistakes” are redeemed. No one tries to obstruct the donation; indeed, it is 
universally extolled. This is not the case in our second case study, which 
complicates the idea of exemplarship as it has been manifested thus far. The 
events we turn to now offer a form of exemplarship less simply emulative and 
more in accord with Caroline Humphrey’s (1997: 41, 43) model of Mongolian 
exemplarship as providing an occasion for deliberation and contestation about 
ideals. 
 
What Dhananjoy Chatterjee did in his l i fe  .  .  .  
Set against the idealized scenario of Basu’s death, is that of Dhananjoy Chatterjee 
in August 2004. Dhananjoy Chatterjee was sentenced to death for the rape and 
murder of a schoolgirl in Kolkata in 1990. He had migrated earlier from his 
ancestral village Chhatna, also in Bengal, to work in the city as a security guard at 
the building where the victim was a resident. During August 2004 the Indian press 
relentlessly, and in great detail, covered the build up to India’s first execution in 
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nine years. For many years Chatterjee’s lawyers had sought to have his sentence 
overturned, but as the date of the execution approached, Chatterjee was reported 
to have “calmed anxious officials” at the Central Jail in Kolkata, telling them, 
“Don’t worry, I will walk to the gallows.” He is said to have asked for bhajans 
(devotional music) to be played, so that in the hours before his death “strains of 
devotional songs played on a music system outside his cell, filled the jail,” and his 
last words, spoken on the morning of August fourteenth [reportedly] were: “I 
forgive you all. May God bless you.” Of particular significance, for our purposes, 
was Dhananjoy’s reported wish to donate his eyes and kidneys.  
As it happens his request was not fulfilled—newspapers reported that nobody 
wanted the kidneys of a murderer, and his family members did not provide the 
consent that would have enabled his eyes to be removed. The publicization of 
Dhananjoy’s wish to donate his organs gave rise to a vigorous public debate, which 
we explore here. We pay particular attention to how Dhananjoy’s (at this point 
prospective) death was framed as possessing compelling didactic value, but for a 
different set of lessons to those that we discussed above. We might say that two 
principal lessons emerged. First, there is the idea that an ethical narrative of 
retribution and deterrence must not be diluted or in any other way subverted. 
There are two rejections here: the state’s rejection of his plea for mercy, and 
onlookers’ rejection of his organs. Both rejections rest on the “heinous nature” of 
Dhananjoy’s crimes. While the state affirms the court directive to capital 
punishment (in the face of human rights protests), the commenting public rejects 
Dhananjoy’s body as now inherently unworthy of further circulation. Thus both 
the modernizing Indian state and the informal online contributors, for their 
independent reasons, reject Dhananjoy’s wishes precisely in order to claim his 
body as an ethical example—and to serve as such, any attempt to write his story as 
something other than a murderer and violator must be denied. Second, a set of 
lessons is directed toward Dhananjoy’s family. In believing that Dhananjoy’s caste 
status would save him, and in refusing consent for organ removal, the family is 
depicted as mired in ritualistic brahminism and other nonrational sensibilities, 
narrowly familistic, and lacking in public spiritedness. So if the didactic value of 
Jyoti Basu’s death originated in his laudable intention to donate his body, in the 
case of Dhananjoy Chatterjee, for many onlookers, the prisoner’s express wish to 
donate his body is precisely that which could—and therefore must not be allowed 
to—inhibit this death’s didactic value (as an exemplary deterrent). But what we find 
is not so simple as one value (that of medical usefulness) being outweighed by 
another value (that of exemplary deterrence)—competing instrumentalisms, so to 
speak. Other lessons are there to be learned, too. The obstructionist family joins 
Dhananjoy as negative exemplar, for if Dhananjoy’s organs must not be circulated, 
the grounds of their noncirculation must nevertheless not be those laid out by the 
family. The grounds of the family’s objection are themselves exemplary, in a 
negative sense.  
The condemned prisoner who actively seeks to donate his organs forms a 
darkly ironic contrast with the notorious Chinese situation, in which prisoners are 
reportedly executed “near the transplant ward with a bullet to the head to preserve 
his or her transplantable organs” (Cohen 2011: 40). It has been noted how the 
“formal and ‘global’ character” of “neoliberalism today” may allow it “to enter into 
novel relationships with diverse value orientations and political positions” (Collier 
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and Ong 2005: 17), and something like this is certainly to be found in the Chinese 
state rationale for the extractive execution:  
The bioavailability of prisoners, at times framed as an ethical 
commitment by the state to a communitarian ethos in which prisoners’ 
bodies were not their individual property in a Lockean sense but 
belonged to the working masses of the Chinese people, emerged as one 
of many experimental efforts by decentralizing units of the Chinese state 
increasingly responsible for income generation. (Cohen 2011: 40) 
Despite the obvious difference in outcome, what connects the two predicaments is 
(1) that the will of the prisoner is in each case overridden, and (2) that the taking of 
their organs is framed by various parties as a source of merit for the executed 
themselves (ibid.). The latter connection recalls again the case of Jyoti Basu whose 
donative death was similarly framed by many as redemptive in terms of alleged 
political mistakes, while its enactment of a willed physiological collectivism both 
connects it to and separates it from the Chinese rationale according to which 
prisoners’ organs are considered “a communitarian resource” (ibid.). 
For some commentators, Dhananjoy Chatterjee’s desire to donate his organs 
was indeed proof of his repentance. For others, however, it was simply a kind of 
subterfuge to gain public sympathy and thus to avoid the execution he deserved. In 
one Internet chat room, under the heading “Should Dhananjoy be hanged?” the 
contributor “snowpony” writes that “the poor thing has agreed to donate his organs 
that only the selfless or those who pray for God’s forgiving could do.” “Debasish 
Ghoshal” declares, “I always wanted him to die, but now that he wants to donate 
his organs, I feel that the devil in him has changed.” Under the heading “Noble 
work at last!” one contributor states, “At last, God has given him a chance to do 
something good. Let him go ahead with donating his body parts.” For this minority 
of sympathetic writers, then, an ethic of deterrence should not be extended in 
order to block Dhananjoy’s laudable attempt at recouping the remaining value his 
life has.22 
However, these contributions provoked numerous heated objections. “I may 
not be all for capital punishment,” “Sahani Joshi” remarks, “but its [sic] kinda 
irritating to see a sympathetic tinge added to the whole drama.” Another quotes a 
proverb in Hindi, sau choohe kha ke billi haz ko chali (“after having eaten a 
hundred mice, the cat goes on Haj”), suggesting that we should be suspicious of 
Chatterjee’s turn to virtue, given the nature of his prior actions. “Sanjaychande” 
suggests that one has to attain the status of donor, and that Chatterjee doesn’t 
qualify: “He has committed a heinous crime. . . . He is no noble soul to donate 
his organs. I can’t even imagine the sympathetic wave you are trying to create. It’s 
absurd to show even a tinge of pity.” The acuity of such arguments is further 
underlined when one considers that giving in India is frequently understood as a 
sign of superiority (Appadurai 1985: 237). Indeed, giving may be used politically 
by hitherto symbolically peripheral groups and individuals precisely as a means of 
                                                
22. The comments quoted in this paragraph and the subsequent two are from the 
following: (1) chat room entries (last accessed in February 2005) posted at:  
http://mboard.rediff.com/board/board.php?boardid=news2004aug12dhan; (2) online 
responses to an article “Dhananjoy wishes to donate eyes, kidneys” published on 
August 12, 2004: http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/aug/12dhan.htm. 
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asserting—and attaining—a dramatically higher caste or class status (Säävälä 2001), 
and hence these writers’ forceful attempt to negate what they see as a contrivance 
on the part of Dhananjoy to attain the prestigious position of benefactor. As 
another contributor bluntly put it: “Do not accept his anything. Let us finish him 
completely.” 
Dhananjoy’s desire to donate thus conflicts with these contributors’ desire that 
he die a particular sort of didactic death—an execution, in public view, one which 
consequently stands as an example to other would-be rapists and murderers. 
Dhananjoy’s claim, in their view, is to a nobility that would render his death a 
martyrdom, a claim that per force must be denied for it hints at a most offensive 
analogy: to the revered Punjabi revolutionary and freedom fighter Bhagat Singh, 
hanged by the British on March 23, 1931, a date now tellingly marked as Shaheed 
Diwas, or Martyr’s day. “Sahani Joshi’s” sardonic: “Is Dhananjoy some Bhagat 
Singh, is he dying a martyrs death?” is matched by “Sanjay’s” much more definitive 
assertion, “He is no Bhagat Singh goddamn!” The now iconic 1930s portraits of 
Bhagat Singh offering his severed head to a deified Mother India point to the 
exemplary character of his martyrdom (Pinney 2004: 126–30). Accepting 
Dhananjoy’s other body parts would be tantamount to placing him in Shaheed 
Bhagat Singh’s own esteemed lineage, a parodic travesty of the nationalist ideal of 
bodily sacrifice. Dhananjoy’s desire to donate his organs here appears a means of 
rewriting a biography and creating an alternative legacy that has no legitimacy in the 
narrative these commentators seek, and therefore must stand rejected in order to 
retain its particular didactic value. A legacy of corporeal magnanimity must not be 
allowed to undermine the legacy they intend (exemplary deterrence).  
A further objection is aired, hinted at already, by “Manoj Tuli”: 
I wish he had never been born and many will agree with me. Now, 
please do not give the eyes of this bugger to anyone else. These are the 
same pair of eyes who saw the poor girl (Hetal) and sent a message to the 
brain to rape and then kill her. And don’t give his kidney to anyone else, 
this is the same kidney which used to be of a rapist. The DNA might just 
match the recipient and he might just become the next Dhananjoy. And 
please do not use his blood or skin or heart or any other replaceable part 
of his body not even bones and bone marrow. Don’t even think of using 
his body as fertilisers of crops! No leather work out of him also. Just get 
rid of him somehow, with minimum pollution to the environment.23  
The disquieting idea that recipients might unwittingly incorporate Dhananjoy’s 
moral qualities along with his organs connects with a large body of literature that 
focuses on the particulate transmissibility of personhood and the politics of 
substance in India. Cooked food, cloth, unreciprocated gifts, and detached parts of 
the body may all serve, in certain contexts, as “powerful media for the flow of bio-
                                                
23. We do not, however, wish to overemphasize the connection. Lock (2001: 75) recounts 
a conversation with an American heart transplant surgeon who similarly expressed 
discomfort at the idea of receiving a heart from a convicted murderer. Many more 
examples could be provided of concerns about contagious biomorality in non-Indian 
contexts. 
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moral qualities between persons” (Laidlaw 2000: 629).24 The dangerous potential 
for the corporeal distribution of murderous intentions—the possibility of yet 
another deviant legacy—becomes a further reason to refuse Dhananjoy’s donation, 
or to establish, beyond doubt, his essential bioineligibility.25 
Such objections on the grounds of corporeal transmissibility operate in a 
biomoral register that would be inadmissible from the standpoint of Indian 
rationalist activists who would read Dhananjoy’s body as holding nothing more or 
less than biomedical value. And yet, the value of even Jyoti Basu’s body was not in 
the first instance biomedical. On the contrary, in both cases presented, the worth 
of donor bodies, and the exemplary value of the respective deaths, was assessed 
first on the bare evidence of their lives. Whatever his failings, Basu died still as the 
“the best Prime Minister India never had”—he was offered the country’s Prime 
Ministership in 1996, but was compelled by the Party to turn it down due to 
concerns over whether the Left would be able to control a coalition government 
without compromising its ideology—his donation a commendable final affirmation 
of the steadfastness of his rationalist atheism that ultimately could forgive all flaws. 
Dhananjoy Chatterjee, by contrast, had no such legacy or philosophical convictions 
to affirm, only his legal conviction to contest and the worth of a life to redeem. 
In the latter effort, he was blocked not so much by the biomoral objections of 
the newspaper reading public who harbored concerns about how his body might 
cause problems for the living, but by the backwardness and incivility (as it is 
presented in the print media) of his own family, who refused their son’s claim to 
modern subjectivity via organ donation. For the execution, the family remained in 
their ancestral village of Chhatna, several hundred kilometers from Kolkata, and 
they did not pick up the body. Dhananjoy’s father had refused to believe that his 
son would hang: “Dhananjoy is the son of a Brahmin and I believe Goddess Kali 
will not allow the hanging of a Brahmin.”26 The father’s statement harks back to 
colonial debates about capital punishment and the inviolable body of the Brahmin. 
Killing a Brahmin has traditionally been understood as the most heinous of crimes 
(Lipner 1989: 45, 47). Controversy arose in colonial India about whether law 
codes should exempt Brahmin caste members—even convicted murderers—from 
execution (Bayly 1999: 87). Dhananjoy’s mother fasted for the week before the 
execution and the family threatened to commit suicide en masse if the sentence 
was effected. Chatterjee himself, though, had begun to accept that his hanging was 
inevitable, stating that he hoped to be reborn as a rich man because only rich men 
get justice—a statement poignantly insisting that it was class rather than caste that 
                                                
24. http://mboard.rediff.com/board/board.php?boardid=news2004aug12dhan, (accessed in 
February 2005). 
25. The term bioineligibility has been proposed by Copeman (2009b) in recognition of the 
fact that the story of transplant biopolitics is not only one of the incorporation of 
marked populations into bioeconomies. Also important are those political economies 
of nonavailability whereby many bodies are rendered closed to biomedicine as well as 
open to it (cf. Cohen 2004).  
26. Deccan Herald, August 15, 2004. 
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counted in his circumstances.27 This was one difference between Dhananjoy and 
his family. 
Another difference lay in their commitment to divergent categories of donation. 
Even as commentators in the blog world were rejecting Dhananjoy’s claims to 
nobility, alternative biography, and even to a rationalism achieved via organ 
donation, his parents were simultaneously portrayed as thwarting a worthy, civic-
minded donative act. On the one hand, Dhananjoy’s mother is reported to have 
spent the night before the execution in the village’s Kali temple, presumably 
making offerings there.28 On the other, the family is subjected to criticism for its 
failure to provide consent (as the law requires) for the fulfillment of Dhananjoy’s 
virtuous donation. When, after the execution had been carried out, the family was 
asked for its consent, it reportedly reacted with incredulity: “They didn’t let him 
live, now they want his eyes and kidneys” (cited in Roy and Dutta 2005: 7). 
Dhananjoy’s family is thus depicted as inhabiting an abject space of backwardness. 
Unwilling to suppress their grief and “superstitious” beliefs concerning the 
inviolability of the Brahmin body in favor of the abstract precepts of bourgeois 
civic-mindedness and modern legal norms, they stand, in this narrative, distinctly 
on the verge of civility (Cohen 2007: 107).  
So how and what did this death teach? One lesson, of course, was to do with 
social position. The rejection of Dhananjoy’s Brahminism as forming a bar to his 
death is the rejection of the argument that his social position will save him, which 
has an ironic resonance with the anti–capital punishment support that Dhananjoy 
also plentifully received. Anti–capital punishment activists paint a picture of 
Dhananjoy as impoverished, lower class and disenfranchised—a person who, 
although Brahmin, is without political connections and thus without hope of 
escaping the gallows. If class trumps caste in this narrative as a major determinant 
of social worth and influence, in Basu’s case they were more tightly imbricated. 
After all, the eulogies and outpouring of grief upon the death of Basu were 
conditional, said one article, on his caste status: “It would not have been the same 
if he did not belong to an aristocratic family or upper caste bhadralok.”29 The 
public death thus brings to the fore without resolving contestation over what counts 
as a worthwhile social position in a “time of expedited social transformation” 
(Battaglia 1999: 136).  
Further, both colonial and postcolonial commentators have long seen South 
Asian “kin-mindedness” as detrimental to the formation of Western-style 
“bourgeois civic culture” (Mazzarella 2003: 139). The media’s negative portrait of 
Dhananjoy’s family indeed feeds into a wider narrative about the problems of 
narrow familism as an obstructive force in the arena of postmortem bodily 
donations. Even in the idealized case of Basu, his relatives are reported to have 
expressed reservations. Though the following quotation from the 
CounterCurrents.org obituary refers to the political class, its complaint about 
families frustrating body donation reflects a more generally felt grievance among 
those wishing to foster bodily donation: 
                                                
27. http://www.dawn.com/2004/08/15/int13.htm  
28. http://www.espardes.com/India/newsbriefs/aug/04/081304.html  
29. http://www.countercurrents.org/rawat180110.htm  
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Politicians and their chamchas i.e. followers [or sycophants], use this 
opportunity [of the death of a political leader] to declare their undenying 
faith in God as well as on priestly class. Most of the politicians in India 
have succumbed to this as they might have been atheists in their personal 
lives but their family never let it be so. At the end despite their being 
atheists or non believers, their family opted for a religious cremation for 
various political purposes.30  
Dhananjoy’s obstructionist family thus stands at one end of a wider field of 
familistic blockage: where the political chamchas are apparently calculative about 
how best to integrate commitment to modernist reason with convention, 
Dhananjoy’s family places its faith in caste and the goddess Kali, thereby assuming 
the status of negative exemplar. The public is taught, via their example, how not to 
behave. It is the reportage on Dhananjoy’s family, then, that returns us from 
differing rationalities and intense biomoral contestations over the value of life and 
the meaning of death to the simple imperative to undo the assorted forms of 
misconceptions and backwardness that block organ donation as a key route to a 
progressive modernity. 
 
Conclusion 
This essay has explored the media genre of the public death in India, where such a 
death is either recent or imminent and made use of for its instructional value. The 
two principal case studies we presented share a concern with bodily donation and 
both were turned into educational episodes or moral dramas. Much also, of 
course, separates them—not least the contrast between smooth facilitation in the 
first case and the multiple refusals amid a ferment of impassioned public debate in 
the second. Yet even these refusals share common ground with the unanimous 
acceptance of Basu’s body: precisely because it is a highly charged moral action 
that may serve to redeem the prisoner, as arguably it did Basu’s political career, it 
must be resisted. The implication here, of course, is that if the organs were not 
offered, but nevertheless taken from the executed prisoner as in the Chinese case, 
they would be far more acceptable (though the problem of possible biomoral 
transfer would remain). We argued that the occasion of imminent or just-effected 
bodily donations has become centrally important to antisuperstition campaigners 
and other actors seeking to promote “a sense of civic life and public interest.” This 
is because of the understanding that it is in the domain of death and dying that one 
can find a consummate concentration of supercharged superstition: dislodge those 
taboos which obstruct bodily donations, this logic asserts, and much else will 
follow. What is clear is that the mediatized moral dramas of the public death are 
now a critical instructional idiom for present-day secular social reformers in the 
subcontinent.  
In conclusion we want to consider historian Partha Chatterjee’s (1999) 
discussion of the ambivalences of “modernization” in India in the light of the 
events we described above. Chatterjee notes that the growing reach and swell of 
electoral politics since the 1970s has resulted in a pitting of democracy against 
modernity. With the dramatic electoral mobilization of an array of what had been 
previously politically invisible groupings—backward castes, tribal populations, 
                                                
30. http://www.countercurrents.org/rawat180110.htm 
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religious minorities, even associations of cinema fans—“the complaint is 
widespread in middle-class circles today that politics has been taken over by mobs 
and criminals” (1999: 116). The result is that “the noble pursuit of modernity” 
appears compromised by “the compulsions of parliamentary democracy” 
(Chatterjee 1999). Chatterjee identifies two principal responses to this situation on 
the part of the governing classes. The first he describes as a suspension of the 
interventionist modernization agenda, which involves “walling-in the protected 
zones of bourgeois civil society” in order that existing civil virtues may be shielded 
from “the potential excesses of electoral democracy” (ibid.: 118). The second is 
more pragmatic: it accepts the limitations of the state’s reach but does not abandon 
the project of social transformation, which it pursues determinedly but modestly—
finding allies where it can, yielding to other authorities on occasion—through the 
contestations of what Chatterjee (ibid.) calls “normatively nebulous political 
society.”  
Not surprisingly, the instructional idiom of dying as expressed in the Basu case 
appears to us as an instance of the latter response. The putative project of 
modernization is clearly not suspended here, with reformist activists and their 
media allies evaluating Basu’s body and his legacy according to its service of a 
“propaganda of reason” (Chakrabarty 2002: 25). Indeed, the harnessing of his 
public death as a means for the continued pursuit of “the project of 
enlightenment” enables us to pinpoint one of the particular forms of the pragmatic 
response to which Partha Chatterjee refers: use of the media-created exemplar as a 
vessel for modernization by means other than the state. 
Dhananjoy’s case, in some contrast to Basu’s, additionally offers an elaborate 
contestation over Chatterjee’s first response, posed as a question about just what 
aspects of modernization should be suspended, and by whom. Dhananjoy’s 
express wish to donate parts of his executed body might be understood, like Basu’s 
own pledge, as a way of speaking at the last that recasts or augments the biography 
of a life. The dying man, to paraphrase Faust (2008: 1), does not lose his essential 
self, but sees an opportunity, via sacrificial disintegration, to (re)define it for 
eternity. There is a sense, then, of the prisoner seeking to take control of the 
means of his dying, causing the execution that happened to him to become 
something that he did.31 And in a limited sense his attempt worked, even though 
the donation was not brought to fruition—some of the public commentators quoted 
above appreciated the gesture, viewing it as critical evidence of reform and/or 
repentance. Others, however, saw only cynical strategy, and redoubled their 
denunciation of a figure whose prior actions they viewed as foreclosing any 
possibilities of such service. Synecdochal biography is employed here almost as a 
tool, as if last actions could be not only life defining but also action-effacing. In 
each case, despite their differing degrees of efficacy, there is at least the suggestion 
of re-narrativization.  
We have seen, also, that Dhananjoy’s family had hoped that their son’s 
Brahminism would save him. When it didn’t, they prepared a pile of stones 
                                                
31. Here we paraphrase Laidlaw (2005: 195). See Madan (1987) on South Asian ideals of 
the active death. For Kashmiri Pandits, for instance, “the ideal is to strive to die in a 
manner which underscores the active role of a person in his own death, as contrasted 
with the passivity conveyed by expressions like ‘passing away’ or ‘dying’” (ibid: 11). 
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outside their hut gate to throw at enquiring journalists, his mother made offerings 
to Kali, there was talk of a plan to construct a “martyr’s statue” of Dhananjoy in the 
village, and his dying wish to donate his eyes and kidneys was blocked to spite a 
state that had not in the first instance spared his life. If Dhananjoy sought to mold 
himself into what Cohen calls an “as-if modern” (2004: 166) in his desire for 
postmortem organ donation, his family rejected his claims entirely and in fact 
countered them. Further, he was rebuffed both by the bourgeois state asserting its 
moral primacy and by blogger-commentators cordoning off zones of civility, each 
erecting distinct barriers to the excesses that Dhananjoy, here reduced to an 
undesired type, represented. As media-created negative exemplar, he had no 
access, in the end, to the nebulous areas of possibility that lie beyond the state, 
though much of the debate about the worth of his life unfolded in those very 
spaces. What unfolded, then, was a very particular biopolitics from the margins.  
Thus, the case studies presented in this essay point on the one hand to domains 
of politics located “neither within the constitutional limits of the state nor in the 
orderly transactions of bourgeois civil society” (Chatterjee 1999: 117), and on the 
other to the processes by which such domains are claimed by individuals and 
institutions seeking to definitively determine what life and death can teach, and 
therefore what they can be worth, in each of their quests for a redemptive 
modernity. 
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La mort didactique : publicité, instruction, et le don du corps 
 
Résumé : Quelle valeur la mort acquiert-elle dans le contexte du don d’organes 
destinés à la transplantation ? La mort devient un sujet de discussion publique 
possible à travers l’énonciation du désir de don d’organes, ou parce que ce désir 
est refusé. Cet article se penche sur deux études de cas en Inde : deux tentatives 
de don, l’un d’un prisonnier condamné à mort et l’autre d’un ancien premier 
ministre marxiste du Bengale Occidental. Une de ces tentatives de don d’organes 
fut idéalisée, exaltée, l’autre fut déjouée ; mais les deux donnèrent suite à un débat 
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public important. La nature publique des ces « souhaits de fin de vie » reflète un 
drame éthique, car nous trouvons au cœur de chacun d’entre eux un concours 
déchirant pour l’âme—autrement dit l’héritage—du donateur. Ces désirs de don 
sont aussi une opportunité pour re-déclencher des reformes sociales et (ré)-
éduquer différents groupes sociaux. Nous nous axons donc sur la fonction 
didactique du don et son problème principal : l’intention du mourant de donner 
ses organes. Quel sens le don d’organe acquiert-il au moment de la mort ? Nous 
soutenons qu’au-delà de sauver des vies, le déroulement de ces drames éthiques 
deviennent, entre autres choses, des opportunités pour le rejet du brahmanisme, la 
transcendance de la superstition, la réaffirmation des valeurs d’un Etat en pleine 
modernisation, et l’inculcation de nombreuses vertus civiles. Faire don de son 
corps lorsque la mort est imminente devient la dernière possibilité pour réécrire 
l’histoire d’une vie, rédiger dignement sa biographie, et transformer l’intime et le 
personnel en objet de valeur publique. Le donateur mourant parle-t-il en tant que 
meurtrier, marxiste, ou autre ?  
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